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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT INVALIDATES
FLORIDA LAW FOR CONFLICTING WITH
FEDERAL LAW TOWARDS CUBA:




In May 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed' the grant for preliminary injunction by the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida,2 which enjoined
the State of Florida from enforcing a law known as the Cuba
Amendment, 3 because it violated the Supremacy Clause4 of the U.S.
Constitution. The Cuba Amendment was a Florida law that
prohibited companies with any business connection to Cuba from
engaging in the bidding process for state contracts valued at one
million dollars or more.
This comment will review the Eleventh Circuit's decision, and
will consider the effect this decision will have on international
commerce. The author's position is that the Eleventh Circuit
correctly enjoined the Cuba Amendment as it violated the
Constitution and impeded the already extensive, federal regulatory
scheme. Further, this comment argues that the Eleventh Circuit's
decision has a great influence on the preservation of both foreign and
domestic entities' ability to engage in international commerce. First,
this comment will discuss the development of federal law governing
relations with Cuba and the Cuba Amendment. Second, this
* J.D., University of South Carolina School of Law, 2014. B.S. in
Finance and Real Estate, Florida State University, 2010.
' See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Transp., 715 F.3d
1268, 1272 (1 Ith Cir. 2013).
2 See Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1308
(S.D. Fla. 2012), af'd sub nom. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't
of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2013).
FLA. STAT ANN. § 251.471 (West 2012).
4 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
5 FLA. STAT ANN. § 251.471 (West 2012).
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comment will discuss the analysis of the district court and the court
of appeals. Finally, it will discuss the practical impact of the
Eleventh Circuit's decision and how it will affect international
commerce.
I. HISTORY
A. FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING RELATIONS WITH CUBA
In 1917, Congress enacted the Trading with the Enemy Act
(TWEA),6 which empowered the President "to regulate and embargo
trade with foreign nations."7 However, the federal government did
not impose its embargo against Cuba until October 1960.8 While the
United States initially recognized Fidel Castro's government after the
revolution to overthrow Fulgencio Batista, 9 relations between the two
countries quickly worsened in August 1960 as Castro began
nationalizing American property without compensation and
establishing his regime as strongly communist.' 0 In January 1961,
the United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba and
restricted any travel there by Americans." The Treasury Department
then promulgated the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACRs)12
in 1963 to enforce the embargo. The CACRs "apply to all persons
and entities subject to United States jurisdiction and generally
6 Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 App. U.S.C.). The Act broadly allowed
the President to regulate, license, and prohibit trade with foreign nations.
7 Odebrecht Constr., Inc., v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268,
1275 (1lth Cir. 2013).
8 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, KIMBERLY ANN
ELLIOTT & MILICA COSIC, CASE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND
TERRORISM, CASE No. 60-3, U.S. v. CUBA (1960- : CASTRO) 1 (2011),
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/sanctions-cuba-60-3.pdf.
9 See Timeline: US-Cuba Relations, BBC NEWS: LATIN AMERICA &
CARIBBEAN (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-
12159943.
10 See Hufbauer et al., supra, note 8; see also Timeline: US-Cuba
Relations, supra note 9.
11 Hufbauer et al., supra note 8. Foreign relations between the two
countries continued to deteriorate after several incidents: the U.S.-backed
failed Bay of Pigs invasion, several plans to assassinate Fidel Castro, and the
Cuban Missile Crisis. See Timeline: US-Cuba Relations, supra note 9.
12 Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R pt. 515.
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prohibit trade with Cuba and travel to Cuba."1 3 Under the CACRs,
"United States jurisdiction" includes only "U.S. corporations, their
domestic and foreign subsidiaries, and any foreign company owned
or controlled by a U.S. citizen."l 4 Notably, this definition does not
permit sanctions against a company for actions by its foreign-parent
company or foreign affiliates that share a common parent company."
Even after the creation of the CACRs, Congress continued to
pass legislation with an eye toward governing its relationship to Cuba.
For example, Congress enacted the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) in
1992 as a response to what Congress found to be the Cuban
government's "consistent disregard for internationally accepted
standards of human rights and . . . democratic values."' 6 The Act
sought to increase "economic sanctions against the Cuban
government while simultaneously permitting humanitarian relief to
the Cuban people." '7 In general, the CDA gives the President
authority to sanction other countries for conducting trade with Cuba
by making them ineligible for aid.' 8
In 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act (Libertad Act), codifying certain regulatory sanctions
against Cuba and extending the federal embargo indefinitely.' 9 One
of the listed purposes of the Act was to "strengthen international
sanctions against the Castro government." 20 Additionally, the Act
requires the President to submit reports to congressional committees
that provide a "description of Cuba's commerce with foreign
countries, including an identification of Cuba's trading partners and
'3 Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1310-11
(S.D. Fla. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't
of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2013).
14 Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1276; see also31 C.F.R § 515.329.
1s Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1276; see also3l C.F.R § 515.329.
'
6 Odebrecht, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 1311 (quoting Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (2012)).
1 Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1276. See generally 22 U.S.C. § 6002 (2012)
(providing the policy reasons behind enacting the CDA).
8 See 22 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (2012).
19 See generally 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91 (2012) (providing the provisions
of the Act); United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1308 n.6 (11th Cir.
2000) (concluding that § 6032(h) "continues the embargo indefinitely and
effectively suspends the . . . requirement that the President revisit the
embargo each year").
20 22 U.S.C. § 6022(2) (2012).
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the extent of such trade."21 This demonstrates further Congress'
intent for the federal government to regulate and to be responsible for
foreign relations with Cuba. Four years later, the passage of the
Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
reduced some of the sanctions, including some restrictions pertaining
to exporting medical supplies and agricultural products. 22 Moreover,
the Act prohibited travel to Cuba for tourist activities.23 The extent
of regulation by Congress into nearly every facet involving Cuba
further indicates its intent for the federal government to be
responsible for foreign relations with Cuba. Although the law over
the past fifty years has generally restricted interaction between the
United States and Cuba, the statutes and regulations are not without
exceptions and President Obama has also lessened some of the travel
restrictions by amending various regulations.24
B. FLORIDA'SCUBA AMENDMENT
It was against this backdrop of federal laws that on May 1, 2012,
Florida Governor, Rick Scott, signed the controversial Cuba
Amendment into law.25 In an open letter to Florida Secretary of State,
Ken Detzner, regarding the bill, Governor Scott explained that he felt
it was imperative to "'continue to place economic pressure on the
Cuban ... government."' 26 Governor Scott further stated that the law
"'demonstrates Florida's commitment to spreading political and
economic freedom in Cuba."' 27
As passed by Governor Scott, the Cuba Amendment provided
that "a company . . . engaged in business operations in Cuba . . . is
ineligible for, and may not bid on, submit a proposal for, or enter into
or renew a contract with an agency or local governmental entity for
21 22 U.S.C. § 603 8(a) & (b)(2) (2012).
22 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-09 (2012).
23 See 22 U.S.C. §7209(b) (2012).
24 See, e.g., Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1305,
1312(S.D. Fla. 2012), af'd sub nom. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., v. Sec'y, Fla.
Dep't of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (1lth Cir. 2013) (discussing the limitations
of the Libertad Act and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act).
25 FLA. STAT. § 251.471 (2013).
26 Odebrecht, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 1310, n.4.
27 id.
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goods or services of $1 million or more." 28 In the terms of the
Amendment, "company" and "business operations" are broadly
defined, which ensured the law would substantially affect for-profit
entities with any commercial ties to Cuba.29
The Cuba Amendment further provided that before bidding on
any government contracts subject to the amendment, a company was
required to submit a certification that it did not engage in business
operations in Cuba.30 If a company filed a false certification, it
would be required to pay a "civil penalty equal to the greater of $2
million or twice the amount of the contract" and would be "ineligible
to bid on any contract with an agency or local governmental entity
for 3 years." 3'
As enacted, the Cuba Amendment has the potential to absolutely
devastate the Cuban economy and to put even more strain on the
relationship between the United States and Cuba. For example,
companies subject to the law would have to cease any business
operations in Cuba to be able to continue to bid on large public
contracts in Florida. Since the federal government had expressly
indicated its intent to regulate foreign relations based on the
extensive framework of laws outlined above, Florida's attempt to
impede the Cuban economy would have undermined the federal
government's approach to Cuba.
28 FLA. STAT. § 287.135(2) (2013).
29 See also Odebrecht, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 1310 ("[a]mendment
effectively encompasses domestic companies with no connection to Cuba
other than by proxy"). "Company" is defined as any "entity or business
association, including all wholly owned subsidiaries, majority-owned
subsidiaries, parent companies, or affiliates of such entities or business
associations, that exists for the purpose of making profit." FLA. STAT. §
215.473(c) (2013). Further, the Amendment defines "business operations"
as "engaging in commerce in any form in Cuba ... including, but not limited
to, acquiring, developing, maintaining, owning, selling, leasing, or operating
equipment, facilities, personnel, products, services, personal property, real
property, military equipment, or any other apparatus of business or
commerce." FLA. STAT. § 281.135(l)(b) (2013).
30 FLA. STAT. § 287.135(5) (2013).
31 FLA. STAT. § 287.135(5)(a)(l}-(2) (2013).
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II. ODEBRECHT CONSTR., INC. V. PRASAD, FLA.
DEP'T OF TRANSP.
A. PARTIES
In this case, the plaintiff, Odebrecht Construction, Inc.
(Odebrecht), is a Florida corporation that has derived almost $4
billion in revenues since its founding in 1990 from government
infrastructure and transportation contracts awarded by agencies in the
State of Florida.32 Odebrecht is a subsidiary of Odebrecht, S.A., a
"'Brazilian conglomerate in the engineering, construction, water and
wastewater, ethanol, real estate, chemical and petrochemical fields"'
that does business throughout the world.3 In 2012, one of Odebrecht,
S.A.'s other subsidiaries, COI Overseas Ltd., was the lead contractor
in a project to expand and overhaul the Cuban Port of Mariel.34
Odebrecht, however, was not involved with the project or any
projects in Cuba. 35
Defendant, Ananth Prasad, was the Secretary of the Florida
Department of Transportation (FDOT), which is tasked with
"coordinating, maintaining, and regulating transportation in the State
of Florida."36 The Secretary is also responsible for enforcing the
Cuba Amendment for the FDOT's contracts worth one million
dollars or more.
B. OPINION OF THE US. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DisTRICT OF FLORIDA
Shortly after the Cuba Amendment was signed into law, but
before its effective date, Odebrecht brought an action in the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the FDOT to challenge the constitutionality of the Cuba
32 See Odebrecht, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 1308-09.
3 Id. at 1309 (citing PI.'s Am. Compl., 120).
34 Id., see also Nick Miroff, US Cuba Embargo Grows New Fangs in
Florida, GLOBAL POST (June 13, 2012), http://www.globalpost.com/dispat
ch/news/regions/americas/cuba/120612/us-trade-embargo-florida-law-odebre
cht.
3 See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Transp., 715 F.3d
1268, 1273 (11th Cir. 2013).
36 Odebrecht, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.37id
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Amendment and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to
prevent its enforcement. The District Court granted the injunction,
concluding that the Cuba Amendment violated the Supremacy Clause,
Foreign Affairs Power, Foreign Commerce Clause and that the
Amendment was inoperative on its own terms.39 The District Court
concluded that the Cuba Amendment violated the Supremacy Clause
primarily because "[fjederal law regulates all aspects of commerce
with Cuba, including but not limited to the importation and
exportation of various goods and services, travel between the United
States and Cuba, and private rights of action against the Cuban
government.,4 0 The pervasiveness of federal law relating to Cuba
thus demonstrates Congress' intent for the federal government to
regulate foreign affairs with Cuba, and not to leave it to the
individual states.
C. OPINION OF THE US. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
In response to the district court's order, the FDOT filed an
interlocutory appeal with the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the Cuba
Amendment is constitutional and that the district court erred in
granting the preliminary injunction.41 The Eleventh Circuit focused
primarily on whether the Cuba Amendment stood "as an obstacle to
the carefully calibrated federal regime."42 The Court concluded that
the Cuba Amendment violated the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution and affirmed the grant of the injunction.43 The Court
held that the Cuba Amendment violated the Supremacy Clause for
three reasons: it applied more broadly, punishing more companies
and more conduct than under federal law; it provided for much more
severe penalties than under federal law; and it undermined the
38 Id at 1308. Odebrecht argued that the Cuba Amendment violated
several provisions of the United States Constitution: the Supremacy Clause,
the Foreign Affairs Power, and the Foreign Commerce Clause. See id. In
addition, Odebrecht argued that the amendment was inoperative by its own
terms. Id
" See id. at 1313-21.
40 Id. at 1316.
41 See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Transp., 715 F.3d
1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2013).
42 Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1274.
43 See id. at 1272.
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President's capacity to direct diplomatic discussions and impose
sanctions on Cuba.4 The practical consequences of the statute would
have included impeding both foreign and domestic companies'
abilities to engage in trade with the United States, eliminating
substantial revenues of those companies, and detrimentally affecting
the state and global economy.
III. DISCUSSION
A. REPORT
The framework of federal laws discussed above was in effect in
2012 when Florida enacted the Cuba Amendment. Where a state law,
such as Florida's Cuba Amendment, conflicts with a federal law, the
Supremacy Clause is implicated and federal law will preempt.45 In
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,46 a decision on which the
Eleventh Circuit relied heavily, the Supreme Court invalidated a law
similar to the Cuba Amendment that was enacted by Massachusetts,
which prohibited trade with Burma because it violated the
Supremacy Clause by conflicting with federal law. The Court
concluded that
44 See id. at 1281.
45 The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution and the laws of
the United States "shall be the supreme law of the land." U.S. Const. art. VI,
cl. 2. This principle gives Congress the power to preempt state laws. See
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
Preemption may occur in several circumstances, see id., but the pertinent
method for preemption here is conflict preemption. "[Sitate law is naturally
preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute." Id. Conflict
preemption includes cases where "'compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility."' Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct
2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)). Additionally, conflict preemption exists when
the state law "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' Id (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
46 Crosby, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
47 Id at 366 (holding the state statute invalid under the Supremacy
Clause because of "its threat of frustrating federal statutory objectives"). On
the other hand, the congressional act imposed only three months after the
enactment of the Massachusetts law "imposed mandatory and conditional
sanctions on Burma" and provided the President discretion to impose those
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[b]ecause the state Act's provisions conflict with
Congress's specific delegation to the President of
flexible discretion, with limitation of sanctions to a
limited scope of actions and actors, and with
direction to develop a comprehensive, multilateral
strategy under the federal Act, it is preempted, and
its application is unconstitutional, under the
Supremacy Clause.48
Finding that all of the concerns present in Crosby were even
more prevalent here, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Cuba
Amendment violated the Supremacy Clause because it "conflict[ed]
directly with the extensive and highly calibrated federal regime of
sanctions against Cuba." 49 According to the Court, the Cuba
Amendment applied "more broadly than the federal regime," thereby
punishing companies like Odebrecht that did not violate federal laws
relating to Cuba.50 The Court also found that the law imposes
substantial penalties that exceed the federal penalties, and that it
effectively "undermines the substantial discretion Congress has
afforded the President both to fine-tune economic sanctions and to
pursue multilateral strategies with Cuba."1 By punishing a broader
set of companies for a broader set of conduct with more severe
penalties than provided for under federal law, the Cuba Amendment
violated the Supremacy Clause, and the Amendment would have
served to harm the financial welfare of companies that have no
control over a remotely connected subsidiary or affiliate that might
be engaging in business activities in Cuba. In striking down this
Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit has potentially protected the state
and global economy from substantial economic harm.
As the Eleventh Circuit notes, the Cuba Amendment applies to
entities and conduct to a significantly broader extent than the federal
regime.52 For example, while the federal framework applies only to a
sanctions and develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to do so. Id
at 368-70.
48 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388.
49 Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1272, 1281.
'
0 d at 1281.
51 Id.
52 id.
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"person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,, 5 3 the Cuba
Amendment affects any "company" engaged in "business operations"
in Cuba.54 The Cuba Amendment punishes U.S. companies for the
actions of their foreign parents or affiliates, regardless of how remote
the connection is between the companies. 5 5 This stands in stark
contrast to the federal regime, which "only sanctions U.S. companies
for their own actions or the actions of their own subsidiaries."56 Here,
the Cuba Amendment would have penalized Odebrecht despite
Odebrecht having no connection to COI Overseas, LTD-the
company renovating Cuba's Port of Mariel-other than a shared
parent company.5 7 Moreover, the Cuba Amendment targets conduct
indiscriminately, without allowing for the same exceptions permitted
under the federal regime; indeed, it "penalizes any commerce with
Cuba." 5 Consequently, the Court held, the Cuba Amendment
improperly "conflict[ed] with federal law 'by penalizing individuals
and conduct that Congress has explicitly exempted or excluded from
sanctions."' 59
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Cuba Amendment
violates the Supremacy Clause because it imposes additional
penalties beyond those provided under federal law.6 0 The TWEA
provides for criminal penalties of up to twenty years imprisonment
and a $1,000,000 fine for a willful violation, or a civil penalty up to
$50,000. 61 While the federal penalties are severe, the Cuba
Amendment imposes additional and substantial penalties, including a
fine that would be at minimum $2,000,000, double that of the
" 50 App. U.S.C. §5(b)(1) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 515.329. These laws
apply only to "U.S. citizens and residents, wherever located; any person
located in the United States; any U.S. corporation; any corporation, wherever
located, that is owned or controlled by a U.S. citizen or resident; and any
corporation, wherever located, owned or controlled by a U.S. corporation
(i.e., a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation)." Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at
1281-82.
54 For definitions of each term, see supra, note 30.
ss Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1282.
56 Id.
5 Id; Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1309
(S.D. Fla. 2012), af'd sub nom. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't
of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2013); Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1273.
5 Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1283.
5 Id. (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 378).
6o Id. at 1283.
61 50 App. U.S.C. § 16(a) & (b)(1) (2012).
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criminal penalty under federal law, and a three-year ban on public
contracting in the state of Florida.62 The potential for such extreme
penalties gives only a few options to companies that would have been
subject to the law-they could either cease bidding on public
contracts in Florida, suffer substantial monetary fines, or cease
business operations in Cuba. However, like Odebrecht and COI
Overseas here, companies that have no control over, or even any
relationship with, a parent company or affiliate would not have that
final option. Consequently, such a company would be limited to the
first two options, which would have innumerable ramifications,
including eliminating sizable portions of the company's revenues and
stunting the state and global economy.
Finally, the Court held that the Cuba Amendment violates the
Supremacy Clause because it "undermines the President's capacity to
fine-tune these sanctions and to direct diplomatic relations with
Cuba." 63 The President's persuasiveness in diplomatic discussions
depends on his ability to offer the benefits of the entire national
economy.64 The Cuba Amendment eliminates a substantial portion
of those benefits: "access to Florida's public contracting market,
worth $8 billion a year at the state level alone."6 5 Considerable
negative response to the Cuba Amendment from countries-
including Canada, Brazil, the European Union, and Norway-only
substantiates the undermining capability of the Amendment to
diplomatic relations.
B. ANALYSIS
The Court properly held that the Cuba Amendment conflicted
with federal law, and therefore violated the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. In conducting its analysis, the Eleventh
Circuit correctly applied Supremacy Clause precedent, relying
considerably on the Supreme Court's decision in Crosby. The issue
62 See id; see also FLA STAT. § 287.135(5)(a) (2013); Odebrecht, 715
F.3d at 1283.
63 Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1285.
6Id. (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381) ("The President's 'maximum
power to persuade [in diplomatic discussions] rests on his capacity to bargain
for the benefits of access to the entire national economy."').
65 
id 
.66 See, e.g., id
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before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the Cuba Amendment stood
"as an obstacle to the carefully calibrated federal regime."67 As
stated by the Supreme Court, what constitutes a sufficient obstacle
"is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal
statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended
effects."' 6 8  The Eleventh Circuit did just that; it conducted an
extensive review of the numerous federal laws in place and
determined the purposes and intended effects of that framework.69
Concluding that these laws were "designed to sanction strongly the
Castro regime while simultaneously permitting humanitarian relief
and economic transactions that will benefit the Cuban people[J" the
Court held that the State of Florida "plainly was not operating in an
area where the federal government ha[d] been asleep at the switch." 70
The pervasiveness of this framework of federal laws indicates
that federal government has made the determination that it is better
suited to regulate foreign relations with Cuba than the individual
states. The Constitution itself provides that federal laws are the
supreme law of the land and the Eleventh Circuit acted in accordance
with that principle when deciding this case.7 ' Moreover, Congress'
delegation of discretionary authority to the President to sanction
Cuba would be rendered ineffective if the Cuba Amendment was
permitted to stand.72 As the Court states, the federal framework
"empower[s] the President to engage in a multilateral approach to
Cuba."7 The Supreme Court noted in Crosby that Congress would
not "have gone to such lengths to empower the President if it had
been willing to compromise his effectiveness by deference to every
provision of state statute or local ordinance that might, if enforced,
blunt the consequences of discretionary Presidential action." 7
"'[T]he differences between the state and federal Acts in scope and
type of sanctions . . . compromise the very capacity of the President
to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other
17 Id at 1274.
68 Id. (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373).
69 See id. at 1275-78.
od. at 1278.
7' See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
72 "[Elnforcement of the Cuba Amendment overrides the nuanced
federal policy." Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1286.
" Id at 1285.
74 Crosby v. Nat'1 Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000).
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governments."' 7 5 Absent the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the Cuba
Amendment would have compromised the President's authority
delegated to him by Congress and it would have contravened the vast
federal framework in place regulating conduct with Cuba.
The FDOT claims that the Eleventh Circuit's own decision in
Faculty Senate of Florida International University v. Winn,76 where
it upheld a state statute restricting state universities from spending
public funds on travel to a country designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism, is controlling. n However, the Eleventh Circuit
distinguishes this case because, unlike the law in Faculty Senate,
"[t]he Cuba Amendment creates more than a minor or incidental
brush with federal law" and its primary intent is "to prohibit or
obstruct domestic and foreign companies' trade with Cuba."
Accordingly, the Court rejected the FDOT's claim that Faculty
Senate was controlling and concluded that the Cuba Amendment was
preempted.79
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit correctly invalidated the Cuba
Amendment because it frustrates the purposes and intent of federal
law and violated the Supremacy Clause.
C. PRACTICAL IMPACT
The Cuba Amendment would have significantly impeded
domestic and foreign entities' ability to engage in trade with the
United States. Moreover, it would have substantially affected the
decisions of these companies to engage in business in Florida. For
instance, Odebrecht has derived a substantial portion of its revenues
from contracting with governmental entities in Florida, including all
of its revenues in 2011, which totals to approximately $214.5
million.80 By subjecting companies like Odebrecht to the Cuba
Amendment, Florida could have caused a company to lose the source
75 Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381).
76Faculty Senate of Florida Int'l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th
Cir. 2010.
77 See Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1286-87.
78 Odebrecht, 715 F.3d at 1287.
79 See id.
so Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1309 (S.D.
Fla. 2012), af'd sub nom. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of
Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11 th Cir. 2013)
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of the majority of its revenues. Additionally, companies located in
Brazil and Canada-Florida's two largest trading partners-
expressed concern about the law. 81 Indeed, these companies
threatened not to invest any more in Florida for fear of being subject
to the Cuba Amendment's penalties.82 The Cuba Amendment would
have also eliminated countless jobs in the state of Florida, potentially
devastating the state's economy while causing significant ripples in
the global economy. By invalidating the Cuba Amendment, the
Eleventh Circuit allowed the framework created by the federal
government to regulate foreign relations and allowed the President to
develop a strategy to sanction the Cuban government without
weakening the economy.
CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit properly affirmed the grant of the
preliminary injunction, enjoining enforcement of the Cuba
Amendment. The Court correctly concluded that the law violated the
Supremacy Clause because it conflicted with the pervasive
framework of federal laws that regulate relations between the United
States and Cuba. Moreover, the Court's decision preserved the
ability of domestic and foreign entities to engage in international
commerce and to affect positively the global economy.
81 See, e.g., Patricia Mazzei, Trading Partners Warn of Backlash if Rick
Scott Signs Anti-Cuba Bill Pushed by Miami-Dade Lawmakers, NAKED
POLITICS, MIAMI HERALD BLOG (Apr. 22, 2012, 9:40 PM), http://miamiherald.
typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2012/04/trading-partners-warn-of-backlash-if-ric
k-scott-signs-anti-cuba-bill-pushed-by-miami-dade-lawmakers.html.
82 See id.
